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No Confusion Here: Proposing
a New Paradigm for the Litigation of
Keyword Advertising Trademark
Infringement Cases
ABSTRACT

Internet search engines such as Google and Yahoo! earn a
majority of their profit from selling advertisements to appear next to
search results. Google's coveted advertising space, however, causes
nightmares for trademark holders when their trademarks are
auctioned by Google to competitors as keywords to trigger the
competitors' advertisements when the trademark is used as a search
term. Advertisers strategically bid on trademarks of competitors to
ensure that their ads appear whenever the trademark is used as a
search term, instead of the advertisements of the trademark holder.
For example, Nike could bid on the trademark for "Adidas," with the
result that Nike ads appear whenever a computer user searches for
Adidas. This strategy can allow advertisers to gain visibility by having
their ads appear next to search results of a competitor, often a more
popular brand. Advertisers also admit to employing the strategy for the
purpose of drawing consumers to their websites, and away from the
website of the trademark holder.
Trademark holders object to this practice on the basis that it
allows competitors to free ride off the goodwill and reputation of a
trademark when used for the specific purpose of diverting consumers.
Because Google derives such a large share of its revenue from
advertising, it has been loath to cater to the desires of trademark
holders and restrict the sale of keywords as advertising triggers,
instead choosing to allow the use of keyword triggers in countries such
as the U.S. where the courts have not taken an aggressive stance
against search engines on the issue.
Courts both inside and outside the U.S. have struggled to
resolve the issues of trademark use and likelihood of consumer
confusion in a way that promotes fair competition while also upholding
policies that protect trademark owners' rights, including those of the
mark's reputation and goodwill. Now that courts are in agreement
355
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that the sale or purchase of a trademark keyword constitutes a use in
commerce, claims will boil down to the issue of a likelihood of
confusion.
Because the harm of a keyword case-misappropriationof a
mark's goodwill-falls on the trademark owner, rather than the
consumer, this Note proposes that keyword plaintiffs should not have
to prove the element of consumer confusion. Rather, the defendant's
intent to divert consumers and free ride off the mark's goodwill should
replace the element of confusion. This Note examines the doctrine of
initial interest confusion as evidence that courts are already moving in
this direction.Finally, the Note argues that, rather than precluding the
development of case law, Google and other search engines should help
remedy the situation by adopting policies that are more favorable to
trademarkholders and consistent across national boundaries.
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In the world of online advertising, search engine advertising is
an extremely common and profitable form of earning revenue, both for
the search engine and the advertiser.' Search engines such as Google
and Yahoo! allow an advertiser to bid on search terms that will trigger
its ad, so that the ad will appear when a computer user enters those
terms into the search field. 2 The search engine websites, which
perform online searches for visitors free of charge, derive revenue
almost exclusively from this form of advertising.3
Advertisers
purchase keyword search terms that are related to their lines of
business, on the theory that a searcher would be more likely to click
on an ad and visit a website if the ad is somehow relevant to what the
computer user had searched for in the first place. Aside from bidding
on their own trademarks and generic terms that are related to the
content of their businesses, advertisers can also benefit by purchasing
a competitor's trademarked name as a keyword trigger, with the
result that their own company's ads will appear when a user searches
for information on the competing company. A basic example would be
Nike purchasing the keyword "Adidas" so that Nike ads would appear
in a list of sponsored links alongside search results when a user
entered "Adidas" as a search query.
When an advertiser uses a third party's trademark-either as
a keyword trigger for its advertising or as a visible part of the ad text
itself-the boundary between permissive use of another's trademark
and unfair capitalization on another's brand name becomes blurred.
Trademark owners have defended their marks by suing both the
search engines that sell the trademarked terms as advertising triggers
and the advertisers who buy the ad space for trademark infringement

1.
Tom Krazit, Google's Quarterly Revenue, Profits Increase, CNET NEWS, Oct. 15,
2009, http://news.cnet.com/8301-30684 3-10376046-265.html (in Google's third quarter fiscal
reports for 2009, the company reported earning $3.96 billion in revenue from ads placed on
Google's sites). Search engine advertising is ideal for advertisers because they can target their
ads to appear when users search for specific content associated with their business (or the name
of a business itself, or of a competitor).
2.
See Manavinder S. Bains, The Search Engine Economy's Achilles Heel? Addressing
Online ParallelImports Resulting from Keyword and Metatag Misuse, 2006 STAN. TECH. L. REV.
6, 76 (2006).
3.
See Google Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., No. C 03-05340 JF, 2005 WL
832398, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2005) ('According to American Blind, Google has reported that
ninety-six percent of its net revenues in the first quarter of 2004 were derived from
advertising."); see also Miguel Helft, Google's Profit Surges in Quarter, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/17/technology/companies/17google.html
(noting that "Google
derives almost all its revenue from text ads that appear next to Internet search results and on
thousands of partner Web sites.").
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under the Lanham Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1114 et. seq. 4
Trademark owners claim that the sale of a trademarked brand
name-be it a company name, product, or service-as an advertising
trigger allows competitors to unfairly profit off of the goodwill and
drawing power of the trademark. 5 The alleged harm occurs when
competitors divert consumers to their advertised sites and away from
the trademark holder's site.6 The premise of this argument is that the
consumer desires to reach the website of the company that
corresponds to the search term entered in the search query, and
therefore would not have arrived at the competitor's advertised site
but for the appearance
of the distracting or misleading
advertisement. 7 Trademark holders also argue that the competitors'
advertisements deceive and confuse consumers into thinking that the
sponsored ads are authorized or approved by the company owning the
8
trademark that was used as a search term.
In suits against search engines, rather than advertisers,
liability is premised on the idea that the search engines are selling
marks without holding the rights to them or having the consent of the
trademark holders to sell them. 9 Search engines argue, however, that

4.
See, e.g., Rescuecom Corp. v. Google., Inc., 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009) (suit brought
against a search engine); Buying for the Home, LLC v. Humble Abode, LLC, 459 F. Supp. 2d 310
(D.N.J. 2006) (suit brought against a competitor).
5.
See, e.g., Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 393, 400 (N.D.N.Y 2006),
vacated, 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009) (Rescuecom's complaint included allegations that Google
attempted to take advantage of the goodwill associated with its trademark); Complaint 11 2,
American Airlines, Inc. v Yahoo! Inc., No. 4-08CV-626-A (N.D. Tex. Oct. 17, 2008), available at
http://doecs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/texas/txndce/4:2008cv0626/181052/1/0.pdf;
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25:70.25 (4th

ed. 2009) ('In the key word cases, where keyword placement of advertising links is being sold,
the search engines are taking commercial advantage of the drawing power and goodwill of these
famous marks."). The trademark concept of "good will" is defined as "the tendency or likelihood of
a consumer to repurchase goods or services based upon the name or source. In a sense, it is name
recognition .... A trademark is considered to be inseparable from its good will [sic]." RICHARD
STIM, PATENT, COPYRIGHT & TRADEMARK 394 (9th ed. 2007).
6.
MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 25:70.25.
7.
It is true that not all search engine users in fact have this intention when they enter
a trademarked brand name as a search query, and in fact may intend to browse not just the site
of the brand name, but other sites as well, which may include those of competing companies. The
legal argument discussed in this note, however, is based off the premise that at least some users
are in fact misled or diverted to a competitor's advertised site, which they would not have visited
if its ad did not appear.
8.
MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 23:11.50.
9.
Jeremy Kirk, Google, Louis Vuitton Face Off in Trademark Spat, IT WORLD, June 4,
2008, http://www.itworld.com/google-louis-vuitton-trademark-fight-080604.
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they do not sell trademarks, only ad space, 10 and that increasing the
choice of keyword triggers for advertisers increases the amount of
relevant information for consumers." Because Google derives such a
large share of its revenue from advertising,1 2 it has been loath to cater
to the desires of trademark holders and restrict the sale of keywords
as advertising, instead choosing to expand the sale of trademarks as
keywords and the permissible use of trademarks in ad text in
countries such as the U.S. where the courts have not taken an
3
aggressive stance against search engines on the issue.'
Many cases have settled at the district court level or while on
appeal, particularly in cases where a search engine is the defendant,
rather than the competing business that purchased the keyword
trigger. 14 For this reason, few federal Courts of Appeals have had the
chance to rule on the legality of the sale of trademarks as search
terms in keyword-linked advertising, and the courts that have
addressed the issue have reached disparate results.1" While the courts
struggled with how to appropriately apply the Lanham Act to the
Internet context, at least one state (Utah) attempted to address the

10.
MCCARTIHY, supra note 5, 25:70.25 ("Of course, the search engine is not literally
'selling' the . . . trademark to a competitor. The search engine is 'selling' advertising space
triggered by the trademark . . . That sort of cry that 'the defendant is selling my trademark!'
appears in the legal arguments of plaintiffs, but it is rhetorical hyperbole.").
11.
See Miguel Helft, Companies Object to Google Policy on Trademarks, N.Y. TIMES,
May 14, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/15/technology/internet/15google.html?scp=3&sq=
google%20trademark&st=cse; infra note 66 and accompanying text.
12.
See Krazit, supra note 1 and accompanying text; supra note 3 and accompanying
text.
13.
See infra notes 47-65 and accompanying text.
14.
E.g., Google Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., No. C 03-05340 JF, 2005
WL 832398 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2005) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss). See Posting of Eric
Goldman (American Airlines and Google Settle Keyword Advertising Lawsuit) to Technology &
Marketing Law Blog, http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2008/07/american airlin l.htm (July
19, 2008, 09:05 EST) (noting settlement of the lawsuit between American Airlines and Google);
Posting of Eric Goldman (American Blinds-Google Lawsuit Settles) to Technology & Marketing
Law Blog, http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2007/08/american-blinds 1.htm (Aug. 31, 2007,
16:43 EST) (noting settlement of Google, Inc. v. American Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., on
Aug. 31, 2007); Google Settles Last Part of Geico Trademark Case, MSNBC, Sept. 7, 2005,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9247020/ (noting settlement of lawsuit between Google and Geico);
see also Erik Larson, American Airlines Drops Google Trademark Suit, BLOOMBERG, July 18,
2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601204&sid=aNtnl9vC6QLc&refer=
technology (discussing American Airlines' lawsuit and noting that "Google settled similar suits
by other U.S. companies before the untested area of trademark law could be addressed by a
judge or jury.").
15.
Joyce E. Cutler, Keyword Issue Likely to Remain Unsettled, Attorneys Say, PATENT,
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT LAW DAILY, June 18, 2008.
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matter by proposing legislation that would ban the sale of trademarks
16
as keyword-triggers for ads displayed in the state.
The two main obstacles to a plaintiffs successful keyword
advertising suit in the U.S. are the "use in commerce" and "likelihood
of confusion" requirements for a trademark infringement claim
brought under the Lanham Act. 17 From the outset, a main source of
disagreement among courts deciding keyword infringement cases
surrounded the proper application of the "use in commerce"
requirement.' 8 In 2008, one attorney described the legal landscape on
the issue, saying that courts in the U.S. had gone "every which way" in
determining whether the sale of keywords constitutes trademark
infringement. 19
While many courts held that the sale of a
trademarked term as a keyword does constitute a use in commerce,
courts in the Second Circuit were outliers in holding that the sale did
not amount to a use in commerce under the Act. 20 The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals' 2009 decision in Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc.
brought that circuit in line with other Courts of Appeals that had
considered the issue, thus reducing a disagreement among courts that
had reached the level of a circuit split.21
Assuming "use" is satisfied, a plaintiff must still prove that a
defendant's actions were likely to cause confusion as to the source of
the advertising. 22 Though the Lanham Act only requires a likelihood of
confusion, rather than actual confusion, this element nonetheless
poses a problem for plaintiffs. As Internet users become increasingly
savvy and familiar with search engines' sponsored links, it becomes
more difficult to argue that consumers are likely to be confused by a

16.
In 2009, Utah proposed a bill that would prohibit the use of trademarks "to deliver
or display an advertisement in Utah" when the trademark was used in a bad-faith attempt to
divert a customer from the mark owner's goods or services. H.B. 450, 58th Leg., 2009 Gen. Sess.
(Utah 2009). The bill passed the Utah House during the 2009 legislative session but died when
the state Senate failed to act on it before adjourning the 2009 term. See Tracking Report for H.B.
450, 58th Leg., 2009 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2009); Posting of Eric Goldman (Utah HB 450 Dies In
Utah Senate Without a Vote) to Technology & Marketing Law Blog, http://blog.ericgoldman.org/
archives/2009/03/utah hb 450 die.htm (Mar. 13, 2009, 10:27 EST).
17.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (delineating the elements of an infringement claim under the
Lanham Act, including the requirements of use in commerce and likelihood of confusion).
18.
Cutler, supra note 15.
19.
Id.
20.
Id. ('The only circuit that is siding with Google on the use in commerce issue of the
sale of a trademark term as keyword is the Second Circuit.").
21.
Id.
22.
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1), 1125(a). The likelihood of confusion is a required element of
infringement claims brought under these sections of the Lanham Act.
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competitor's advertisement. 23 As a result, if the allegedly infringing
advertisement does not display the plaintiffs trademark in the text of
the ad, an infringement claim may fail due to the inability to prove a
likelihood of confusion. 24 This is often the result despite the fact that
the trademark holder is still harmed by a competitor's luring
consumers through the use of the plaintiffs protected mark, 25 all while
the search engine profits from the sale of the marks. 26 While it may be
27
in part true that "[u]nfair competition is the child of confusion,"
unfair competition can also exist due to misappropriation of goodwill,
even when no confusion exists. Therefore, rejecting a trademark claim
because confusion cannot be proven is inappropriate as it unfairly
precludes the trademark holder from receiving relief for injury to a
mark.
Any rule regarding the legality of trademarked keyword
advertising must balance the interests of the trademark owner in
protecting the value of goodwill in the mark, consumers' desire for an
informative marketplace without deception, and advertisers' rights to
fair competition and marketing. Such a rule should shift away from
the current ineffective focus on consumer confusion and instead
reengage trademark policies and laws intended to safeguard the
trademark's value to the trademark owner. The development of the
initial interest confusion doctrine, which determines the likelihood of
confusion based on the diversion of consumer attention rather than
actual consumer confusion, can be viewed as support for this shift in
the analysis of Internet trademark claims. Because the harm of a
keyword case-misappropriation of a mark's goodwill- falls on the
trademark owner, rather than the consumer, trademark law concepts
meant to protect the consumer should be given little or no weight in
an infringement analysis. This Note proposes that a trademark owner
should not have to prove confusion in order to prevail on a trademark
23.
See Matthew A. Kaminer, The Limitations of Trademark Law in Addressing
Trademark Keyword Banners, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 35, 48-49 (1999)
(quoting a commentator as saying "Anyone who has spent even a scintilla of time on the web
lately knows that splashy advertising banners sprout from every imaginable bit of spare real
estate.").
24.
See discussion infra Part I.B. 1, Components of Trademark Infringement.
25.
See, e.g., Soilworks, LLC v. Midwest Indus. Supply, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1132
(D. Ariz. 2008) ("Soilworks admits that its intent in using the phrase 'soil sement' [as keywords
and metatags] on the Internet was to trade off Midwest's goodwill in its Soil-Sement mark by
diverting potential customers to Soilworks' Soiltac product.").
26.
Krazit, supra note 1.
27.
Charcoal Steak House of Charlotte, Inc. v. Staley, 139 S.E.2d 185, 188 (N.C. 1964)
(quoting Cleveland Opera Co. v. Cleveland Civic Opera Ass'n, 154 N.E. 352, 353 (Ohio Ct. App.
1926)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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infringement claim when the defendant is a competitor using the
plaintiffs trademark specifically to generate greater advertising
visibility alongside search results and is not using the mark in a
permissible fair use context.
Part I provides background regarding the use of trademarks in
search engine advertising and a discussion of the required elements of
a trademark claim under federal law. Part II reveals the limitations
of the current trademark litigation scheme in the keyword context,
arguing that the third party's misappropriation of the mark's goodwill
should replace confusion as the premise for a finding of infringement.
Part III analyzes relevant trademark laws and judicial decisions from
the United Kingdom and Canada in order to compare how these
common law countries have approached the keyword advertising
problem and the similar obstacles facing plaintiffs in these countries.
Lastly, Part IV concludes with an explanation of the importance of
implementing these changes, both in the policies of search engines and
in the approach to trademark litigation, in order to arrive at the best
solution to the keyword problem that can work on an international
scale.
I. BACKGROUND
A. How It Works: The Use of Trademarks in Keyword Advertising
Search engines use keyword-linked advertising to provide
relevant advertising to their site visitors while simultaneously
increasing their revenue streams. 28 The more relevant the advertising
is to the user's search query, the more advertisers are willing to spend,
thus generating more revenue for the search engine.2 9 Keywords are
search terms that a user enters to retrieve information and may be
any term that the user thinks is relevant. 30 The search term could be

28.
Saul Hansell, Google Wants to Dominate Madison Avenue, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30,
2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/30/business/yourmoney/30google.html; see also supra note
3.
29.
Hansell, supra note 28 ('Because the ads are more relevant [to users]...,they create
a better return for advertisers, which causes them to spend more money, which gives Google
better margins."').
30.
See Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 701-02 (E.D. Va.
2004) (in background information, explaining how search engines work); see also Darren Dahl,
Real-Life
Lessons
in
Using Google Ad Words,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Oct.
14,
2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/1O/15/business/smallbusiness/15adwords.html
(explaining how
Google's
keyword advertising program functions);
Google, Welcome to AdWords,
https://www.google.com/accounts/ServiceLogin?service=adwords&cd=null&hl=enUS&ltmpl=
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a generic one such as "ice cream," a proper name such as "Barack
Obama," or a trademark, such as "Kleenex."3' 1 When conducting a
search, search engines retrieve results by matching the keywords
entered by the computer user with text and hyper text markup
language (HTML) code in places such as domain names, websites
themselves, and metatags. 32 Metatags are part of a website's internal
HTML code that describes the content of the website and, at least in
the early days of the Internet, were a main factor in determining a
web site's rankings. 33 A website is more likely to appear as a search
result-and to appear closer to the top of the results page-the more
often the keyword that is used as a search term appears in the
metatags and in the text of the website. 34 Since metatags are only
used in internal code, they are invisible to someone visiting the
website. 3 A website can add competitors' trademarks as metatags
and, without mentioning the competitors in the website text, attract
visitors by appearing in search results when the competitors'
trademarks are used as search terms. 36 Although search engines
today employ complex algorithms that are less easily manipulated by
metatags, 37 advertisers can continue to rely on search engines as a
means for promoting their websites by participating in keyword
advertising.

adwords&passive=false&ifr=false&alwf=true&continue=https% 3A%2F%2Fadwords. google.com%
2Fselect%2Fgaiaauth%3Fapt%3DNone%26ugl%3Dtrue (last visited Dec. 20, 2009).
31.
Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 330 F. Supp. 2d at 701-702 (in discussing background
information, explaining how search engines work).
32.
See MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 25:69 (explaining the function of metatags); see also
Google, Corporate Information: Technology Overview, http://www.google.com/corporate/tech.html
(last visited Dec. 20, 2009) (explaining how Google analyzes both website importance, as
determined by Google, and page content in ranking search results).
33.
MCCARTIrY, supra note 5, § 25:69 (defining metatags and noting that "[s]earch
engines in the early days of the Internet relied heavily on metatags to find Web sites," but that
'modern search engines make little if any use of metatags.")
34.
See id. ('These words inserted in a Web site [as metatags] are invisible to the human
user but, all too perceptible to a search engine. Some search engines may count these hidden
words as if they appeared on the screen, leading to high placement on search lists.").
35.
Id.
36.
See, e.g., N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir.
2008) (trademark owner sued a competitor for trademark infringement where defendant used
the plaintiffs trademark in metatags of its website); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 25:69
("These hundreds or thousands of hidden words... are inserted on purpose to intercept search
engines and the humans that use them to divert them to a site they did not want to go to and did
not expect. The hope is that once there, the user will linger and see the advertising and content
of that Web site. Or, perhaps the user of the hidden code merely wishes to increase the number
of "hits" of its Web site so as to impress potential advertisers that this Web site is a busy place.").
37.
See supra note 33.
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Search engines such as Google sell advertising linked to
keyword search terms, "so that when a consumer enters a particular
search term, the results page displays not only a list of Websites
generated by the search engine program using neutral and objective
criteria, but also links to Websites of paid advertisers (listed as
'Sponsored Links')." 38 Search engines sell terms to the highest bidder
and obtain revenue when users click on the advertised links. 39 Unless
prohibited by the advertising policies of the search engine, advertisers
can purchase keywords that are trademarks of competitors. 40 This
allows an advertiser such as Wal-Mart to purchase "Kmart" as a
keyword, with the result that either a Wal-Mart banner
advertisement or a sponsored link to Wal-Mart's website will appear
alongside search results after a computer user enters "Kmart" into the
41
search engine.
This marketing regime can be particularly useful for a new or
little-known business trying to gain recognition and reach consumers.
The unknown or unpopular business can increase its visibility and
counteract the fact that few users are likely searching for its brand by
making strategic purchases of more well-known trademarks of
competitors as keywords so that the ads for the unknown business
appear when a user searches for a more well-known company.
Alternatively, the strategy can also work in the reverse, with a
company like Nike purchasing the trademark of an unfamiliar shoe
brand, so that Nike's ads would appear whenever the unfamiliar
trademark was used as a search term. Because of the nature of the
advertising programs whereby terms are sold to those who can pay the
most, 42 a company with resources such as Nike's could more easily
carry out the strategy than a start-up, fledging business.

38.
Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 702 (E.D. Va. 2004);
see
also
Google,
How
to
Get
the
Most
Out
of
Your
Ad
Budget,
https://adwords.google.com/select/tour/4.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2009).
39.
See Dahl, supra note 30 (explaining that advertisers buying ad space on Google's
AdWords pay-per-click program "pay Google only when someone clicks on [their] ad"); Stefanie
Olsen, In Search of Profits, CNET NEWS, May 8, 2003, http://news.cnet.com/In-search-ofprofits/2030-1032 3-1000366.html.
40.
See, e.g., Posting of Meghan Keane (Google Loosens Up on Trademarks) to
Econsultancy Blog, http://econsultancy.com/blog/3824-google-loosens-up-on-trademarks (May 15,
2009) (explaining the effects of Google's May 2009 trademark policy change).
41.
See Bains, supra note 2, 2.
42.
Olsen, supra note 39.

KEYWORD ADVERTISING

2010]

Because Google.com is the most frequently visited website on
the Internet 43 and dominates three-quarters of the online search
market, 44 it is one of the most desirable and most visible advertising
venues on the Internet. Its advertising policies, therefore, have farreaching ramifications. Google's keyword-linked advertising program,
AdWords, is accompanied by a Keyword Suggestion Tool, through
which it actively recommends certain keywords-including the
trademarks of competitors-to advertisers in order to make the
client's advertising more successful and to generate increased profits
for the client. 45 Prior to 2004, Google's policy was to block the
purchase of trademarks as keywords in its AdWords program once
Google was informed (usually by the trademark owner) that a
46
particular keyword was a trademark not belonging to the purchaser.
Currently, however, Google has two separate policies with
regard to the use of trademarks in connection with advertising, 47 and
the policy that is used for a particular trademark complaint depends
on the country or geographic region in which the trademark holder
has rights in the mark at issue. 48 For rights held in many countries in
the European Union, such as France, Germany, Austria, the
Netherlands, and Spain, along with about 70 other regions designated
by Google, Google permits trademark holders to bring complaints of
49
trademarks being used in the text of ads or as keyword triggers.
Upon Google's finding of an offending textual or keyword use, Google

43.
As judged by the number of Google's web visitors per day. See Alexa Internet, Google
Traffic Statistics, http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/google.com (last visited Dec. 20, 2009).
44.
Cutler, supra note 15; see MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 25:67 ('By 2003, threequarters of all online searches used GOOGLE or sites that used GOOGLE's search results.").
45.
This was a main premise of the plaintiffs infringement claim in Rescuecom Corp. v.
Google, Inc. See 562 F. 3d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 2009) (describing Google's AdWords program and
Keyword
Suggestion Tool);
see also Google,
Google AdWords:
Keyword
Tool,
https://adwords.google.com/select/KeywordToolExternal (last visited Dec. 20, 2009).
46.
Google Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., No. C 03-05340 JF, 2005 WL
832398, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2005); Benjamin Aitken, Keyword-Linked Advertising,
Trademark Infringement, and Google's ContributoryLiability, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 21, 11
4.
47.
See Google, What is Google's AdWords and AdSense Trademark Policy?,
http://adwords.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?answer=6118 (follow "I see an unauthorized ad
using my trademark. What is Google's trademark policy?" hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 20, 2009).

48.

Id.

49.
Google,
What is Google's AdWords and AdSense Trademark Policy?,
http://adwords.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?answer=6118 (follow "I see an unauthorized ad
using my trademark. What is Google's trademark policy?" hyperlink; then follow "Regions in
which we investigate use in both ad text and keywords" hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 20, 2009)
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will stop the advertiser from continuing to use the trademark as a
50
keyword trigger and/or in the ad text.
In a second group of countries, including the U.S, the United
Kingdom, and Canada, 1 Google has a more "hands off' policy and will
52
only monitor the use of trademarks in the ad text, not as keywords.
In June of 2009, the list of countries in which trademarks became fair
game for keyword-bidding was expanded to include a total of almost
200 regions.5 3 Google also maintains a specific policy for trademark
rights held in the U.S. 5 4 Under this policy, Google allows use of
trademarks in the ad text if the advertiser actually sells the
trademarked product or if the competitor is using the trademark for
an informational purpose, as long as the advertisement does not use
55
the trademark in a "competitive, critical, or negative" manner.
However, these restrictions only apply to an advertiser's ability to use
another's trademark in the text of its sponsored link and do not affect
56
an advertiser's ability to bid on keywords.
Google's policy shift towards more permissive trademark use in
the countries in this second group was made partly in reliance on a
traditional trademark rule which holds that no infringement occurs in
the use of a trademark unless there is a likelihood of consumer
confusion.5 7 Google maintains that if the trademark does not appear
in the competitor's ad, the ad cannot cause confusion as to the source

50.
Id. Upon receiving a complaint regarding rights to a mark held in these regions,
Google conduct a review that is "limited to ensuring that the advertisements at issue are not
using a term corresponding to the trademarked term in the ad text or as a keyword." Id.
51.
Id.
52.
Id.
53.
Andy Atkins-Krtiger, Google Expands New Trademark Policy -But Sidesteps Europe,
MULTILINGUAL SEARCH, May 7, 2009, http://www.multilingual-search.com/google-expands-newtrademark-policy-but-sidesteps-europe/07/05/2009.
54.
See Google, What is Google's AdWords and AdSense Trademark Policy?,
http://adwords.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?answer=6118 (follow "Isee an unauthorized ad
using my trademark. What is Google's trademark policy?" hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 20, 2009).
55.
Google, What is Google's U.S. Trademark Policy?, http://adwords.google.com/support/
aw/bin/answer.py?answer=145626 (last visited Dec. 20, 2009).
56.
Id.; Google, What is Google's AdWords and AdSense Trademark Policy?,
http://adwords.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?answer=6118 (follow "I see an unauthorized ad
using my trademark. What is Google's trademark policy?" hyperlink; then follow "Regions in
which we investigate use in ad text only" hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 20, 2009).
57.
Stefanie Olsen, Google Plans Trademark Gambit, CNET NEWS, Apr. 13, 2004,
http://news.cnet.com/Google-plans-trademark-gambit/2100-1038_3-5190324.html
(reporting on
Google's justification for its original decision in 2004 to allow trademark bidding in the U.S.);
Pamela
Parker,
Google
Shifts
Trademark Policy,
CLICKZ,
Apr.
13,
2004,
http://www.clickz.com/3339581; see discussion infra Part I.B.1, Components of Trademark
Infringement.
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of the ad, because there is nothing to suggest a connection with the
trademark except for the fact that the competitor's ad appears
alongside the search results for the trademark. 8 According to Google,
the mere presence of ads on a page cannot confuse consumers. 59 The
policy shift also likely relies on trademark fair use theories that
permit the legal use of another's trademark in certain situations, such
60
as in comparative advertising.
However, the policy change cannot be explained solely as a
product of these legal concepts, since fair use and likelihood of
confusion are key parts of trademark law in countries that fall under
Google's more restrictive trademark policy as well. 6 1 Instead, the
difference between countries that do and do not fall under the first,
more protective trademark regime is directly tied to how courts in the
different countries have handled keyword trademark disputes. 6 2 For
example, trademarks held in France and Belgium, where courts have
strictly interpreted trademark laws and imposed liability against
Google and eBay for trademark infringement, 63 receive the protection
of Google's restrictive policy, in which they cannot be used as
keywords or in the ad text.6 4 In contrast, in countries where search

58.
Parker, supra note 57.
59.
Id. (quoting Google's trademark counsel as stating that "We don't think that merely
seeing ads on a page is going to be confusing to users . . . . If they're confused it's because of
something in the ad text.").
60.
See discussion infra Part I.B.3, Non-infringing Uses and Defenses.
61.
See Terrance J. Keenan, American and French Perspectives on Trademark Keying:
The Courts Leave Businesses Searching for Answers, 2 SHIDLER J. L. COM. & TECH. 14,
24,
available
at
http://www.lctjournal.washington.edu/Vol2/a014Keenan.html# Toc122496289
(noting similarities between U.S. and French trademark law). However, French law does not
require a likelihood of confusion when the trademark is used "in any act of commercial
competition conducted with a counterfeit mark." Id.
25. Member states of the European Union
have adopted the European Union Trade Marks Directive, which also bases a finding of
infringement on a likelihood of confusion. Council Directive 2008/95/EC, art. 5(1)(b), 2008 O.J. (L
299) 25 (EU) [hereinafter Council Directive]. The Directive does not prevent individual member
nations from establishing their own procedures for determining the existence of confusion. Id. §
11. Some provisions of the Directive do not require a showing of confusion. Id. at art. 5(5).
62.
See Atkins-Kriger, supra note 53 ('[With its new policy changes,] Google has
sidestepped the key European countries with the strongest legal rules and where cases have cost
Google most in fines.")
63.
Georgie Collins, Do Trade-Marked Adwords'Infringe?, MONDAQ BUSINESS BRIEFING,
Oct. 30, 2008, http://www.allbusiness.com/legal/trial-procedure-decisions-rulings/118358291.html; Elinor Mills, Google Loses French Trademark Lawsuit, CNET NEWS, June 28, 2006,
http://news.cnet.com/Google-loses-French-trademark-lawsuit/2100-1030 3-6089307.html.
64.
See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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engines have fared better in trademark litigation, Google allows
65
trademarks to be used as keyword advertising triggers.
By adopting the more lenient policy, Google intended to
increase the information available to consumers 66 and to avoid
arbitrating trademark disputes that, according to the company, should
be resolved between the trademark holder and the advertiser 67 -not
between the trademark holder and Google. By directing trademark
holders to voice their complaints with the advertisers who purchase
68
the trademarks as advertising triggers, rather than with Google,
Google both avoids arbitrating disputes and reduces its own exposure
to litigation. Allowing advertisers to bid on trademarks as keywords
increases the choices of sponsored links and, consequently, the amount
of relevant information presented to searchers.6 9 While consumers
may benefit from the increase in information, however, Google cannot
deny that it also reaps a benefit from allowing trademarks to be used
as keywords, since its profits increase when more terms are available
for bidding.7 0 Meanwhile, allowing trademarks to be auctioned as
keywords forces advertisers to increase bids for their own trademarks
to ensure that their authorized sponsored links appear above ads from
71
competing companies.
Other search engine websites, such as Yahoo!, have advertising
policies that are more favorable to trademark holders, as they more
65.
See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text; Kate Tebbutt, Recent Changes to the
Google AdWords Trade Mark Policy in the UK and Ireland, 2 BLOOMBERG EUR. BU S. L. REV. 398,
398-401 (2008), available at http://www.dechert.com/library/Recent%/20Changes%/20to%/20the%/
20Google% 20Adwords% 20Trade% 20MarkO20Polic.PDF (discussing the connection between a
favorable trademark ruling for Yahoo! UK and Google's change of trademark policy in the UK).
66.
See Helft, supra note 11 (Google justified its 2009 trademark policy shift under the
theory that "the change would result in ads that are more relevant to users.").
67.
See Google, What is Google's U.S. Trademark Policy?, http://adwords.google.com/
support/aw/bin/answer.py?answer=145626
(follow "I see an unauthorized ad using my
trademark. What is Google's trademark policy?" hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 20, 2009) (Google's
policy states, "Because Google is not a third-party arbiter, we encourage trademark owners to
resolve their disputes directly with the advertisers...").
68.
Id.
69.
Barry Schwartz, Google Adl'ords Opens Up Trademarked Bidding to Most
Countries, SEARCH ENGINE LAND, May 5, 2009, http://searchengineland.com/google-adwordsopens -up -trademarked-bidding-to -most-countries- 18628 (regarding the May 2009 policy change,
Google noted that "a user searching with a trademarked keyword may see a greater number of
relevant ads in the sponsored links section, giving them greater choice."); see also Helft, supra
note 11.
70.
See Tom Krazit, Google Change Could Stir More Advertiser Angst, CNET NEWS, May
15, 2009, http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023 3-10242104-93.html (discussing how Google's policy
shift will affect Google's profits); Helft, supra note 11 (same).
71.
Krazit, supra note 70.; Atkins-Kri~ger, supra note 53(noting that allowing
advertisers to bid on trademarks increases advertising costs by 80%).
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tightly regulate the sale of trademarks as keywords to advertisers. 72
Yahoo! reviews trademark complaints that arise both when
advertisers use trademarks as bid-for keywords and when advertisers
use trademarks in the content of ad text. 73 In 2006, Yahoo! modified
its policy to restrict situations in which advertisers can bid on a
keyword that contains a competitor's trademark. 74 For an advertiser
to successfully bid on another's trademark, Yahoo! requires that the
advertiser either sell the trademarked product itself on the advertised
site or that the site be maintained solely for informational, rather
than commercial, purposes and is not competitive with the
trademarked product. 75 Yahoo!'s trademark complaint policy does not
indicate that it treats complaints differently depending on the country
in which the trademark rights are held or registered, as Google does. 76
B. Applicable U.S. Law & Concepts
Federal trademark law in the U.S. is a subset of unfair
competition law. 77 Trademark holders acquire rights in a trademark
through use of the mark under the common law of the states where
the marks are used. 78 Registration, available at both the state and
federal levels, can provide additional protection to the trademark
holders. 79 The Lanham Act, which establishes a federal registration
72.
See Posting of Eric Goldman (American Airlines Sues Yahoo for Selling Keyword
Advertising) to Technology & Marketing Law Blog, http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2008/10/
american airlin_2.htm (Oct. 20, 2008, 15:35 EST) (referring to an apparent consensus that
Yahoo! "has a much more trademark owner-favorable trademark policy than Google").
73.
Yahoo! Search Marketing, Raising Trademark Concerns About Sponsored Search
Listings, http://searchmarketing.yahoo.com/legal/trademarks.php (last visited Dec. 20, 2009).
74.
Kevin Newcomb, Yahoo! Modifies Trademark Keyword Policy, CLICKZ, Feb. 24, 2006,
http://www.clickz.com/3587316.
75.
Yahoo! Search Marketing, Raising Trademark Concerns About Sponsored Search
Listings, http://searchmarketing.yahoo.com/legal/trademarks.php (last visited Dec. 20, 2009).
76.
See id. However, a case pending in the Northern District of Texas brought by
American Airlines against Yahoo! alleges that Yahoo! does have different trademark procedures
for the U.S. and Europe. Complaint 6, American Airlines, Inc. v Yahoo! Inc., No. 4-08CV-626-A
(N.D. Tex. Oct. 17, 2008), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/districtcourts/texas/txndce/4:2008cvOO626/181052/1/O.pdf. The case is set for trial in January of 2010.
Order Setting Schedule 6, American Airlines, Inc. v Yahoo! Inc., No. 4:08-CV-626-A (N.D. Tex.
Mar. 13, 2009), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/texas/txndce/
4:2008cv00626/181052/38/0.pdf.
77.
MCCARTIY, supra note 5, § 2:7.
78.
Id. § 16:1 ('At common law, ownership of trademark or trade dress rights in the
United States is obtained by actual use of a symbol to identify the goods or services of one seller
and distinguish them from those offered by others.").
79.
See id. § 19:8, 19:3 ("Although a federal registration will give the owner of a mark
important legal rights and benefits, the registration does not create the trademark... While
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scheme for marks used in U.S. commerce, provides causes of action for
federally registered marks as well as for common law (unregistered)
80
marks.
1. Components of Trademark Infringement
Under the Act, a defendant can be held liable for trademark
infringement only if the trademark was used in commerce.8 1 Thus,
the first step in any infringement claim is to determine whether the
defendant's trademark use satisfies the use in commerce
requirement; 82 the analysis at this point does not take into account
effects of the use on the consumer.8 3 Section 45 of the Act, codified at
15 U.S.C. § 1127, defines "use in commerce" as the bona fide use of a
mark either on goods or services84 With regard to goods, use in
commerce occurs when the mark is
placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or the displays associated
therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto, or if the nature of the goods makes
such placement impracticable, then on documents associated
with the goods or their
85
sale, and the goods are sold or transported in commerce.

Similarly, use of a mark in connection with services is considered to
occur in commerce when the mark is
used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services and the services are rendered in
commerce, or the services are rendered in more than one State or in the United States
and a foreign country and the86 person rendering the services is engaged in commerce in
connection with the services.

Aside from the threshold requirement of trademark use,
infringement claims under the Lanham Act also require a
demonstration that the use will cause a likelihood of confusion, 87 or a
determination of whether the use of the marks is likely to confuse
consumers about the source of products. 88 This requirement is known
federal registration is encouraged, nonregistration does not impact on existing state or federal
common law rights in a mark.")
80.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1051-1072, 1091-1096, 1111-1127 (2009).
81.
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1).
82.
Id.
83.
See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in
Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1597, 1599 (2007).
84.
Lanham (Trademark) Act of 1946, ch. 540, § 45, 60 Stat. 427, 443-444 (1946)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2009)).
85.
15 U.S.C. § 1127.
86.
Id.
87.
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a).
88.
See Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1053 (9th
Cir. 1999) (quoting Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. Goss, 6 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1993)).
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as the core element of a traditional trademark infringement claim. 89
Section 32 of the Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1114, provides a cause of
action against any person who, without the consent of the trademark
holder,
use[s] in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a
registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising
of any goods or services on or in connection
with which such use is likely to cause
90
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.

Therefore, in order to infringe a federally registered trademark under
§ 1114(1)(a), the use must be "likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive."9 1 Similarly, § 1125(a)(1) provides a cause of
action for the infringement of unregistered marks when the use is
likely to cause confusion specifically with regard to the origin,
sponsorship, or approval of goods. 92 The amount and nature of
confusion necessary to satisfy this requirement has been the target of
much debate among trademark law scholars. 93
Courts have
established various multi-factor tests to determine the likelihood of
confusion, 94 with most courts applying a version of the eight factors set
forth by the Ninth Circuit in AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats:
(1) similarity of the conflicting marks; (2) proximity of the two companies' products or
services; (3) strength of the plaintiffs mark; (4) marketing channels used by the two
companies; (5) degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers in selecting goods; (6)
defendant's intent when selecting the mark; (7)9 5evidence of actual consumer confusion;
and (8) likelihood of expansion of product lines.

89.
See, e.g., Allard Enters. v. Advanced Programming Res., Inc., 146 F.3d 350, 355 (6th
Cir. 1998) (internal quotations omitted) (describing the likelihood of confusion as the "touchstone
of liability'); MCCARTHY, supra note 5, §23:1 (noting that "the test of likelihood of confusion is
the touchstone of trademark infringement"). In contrast, a federal trademark dilution claim does
not require a showing of confusion. See infra Part I.B.2.
90.
Lanham (Trademark) Act of 1946, ch. 540, § 32, 60 Stat. 427, 437 (1946) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2009) (emphasis added)).
91.
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a).
92.
Id. § 1125(a).
93.
Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 83, at 1599.
94.
See, e.g., Venture Tape Corp. v. McGills Glass Warehouse, 540 F.3d 56, 60-61 (1st
Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1622 (2009) (citing and applying the "Pignons analysis" for
confusion established in Pignons S.A. de Mecanique de Precision v. Polaroid Corp., 657 F.2d 482,
487 (1st Cir. 1981)); Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir.
2004) (citing and applying the 9th Circuit likelihood of confusion test established in AMF Inc. v.
Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979)).
95.
Julie A. Rajzer, Comment, Misunderstanding the Internet: How Courts are
Orerprotecting Trademarks Used in Metatags, 2001 MICH. ST. L. REV. 427, 433 (2001) (citing
AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979)) (asserting that most courts
use the Sleekcraft test).
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These factors do not constitute an exhaustive list and no one factor is
dispositivei 6
In the context of online advertising, some courts have applied
the initial interest confusion doctrine instead of the Sleekcraft
factors.97
Though utilized as part of the likelihood of confusion
determination, the analysis focuses on the diversion of consumers
through the capture of attention, and not through deception or
confusion. 98 The doctrine, first applied to the Internet context by the
Ninth Circuit9 9 and thereafter adopted by at least six other circuits, 0 0
holds that confusion occurs when a consumer's interest is diverted
from the site for which he was searching, site A, to another website,
site B, due to the fact that site B has included the trademarks of site A
in its metatags or has purchased site A's trademarks as search
terms. 10 1 Even if there is no genuine consumer confusion as to the
source of site B once the consumer arrives there (that is, if the
consumer realizes that he has arrived at a competitor's site instead of
the earlier intended site), likelihood of confusion can still be
established since the owner of site B has improperly benefited from
the goodwill of the trademark holder. 10 2 This improper benefit arises
from the possibility that the consumer will simply choose to purchase
from site B, "rather than fight his or her way back to the intended
venue." 10 3 However, according to the principles of initial interest
confusion, even if the consumer does not complete a purchase from site
B, the consumer's diversion alone may suffice to establish the
96.
See, e.g., AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348 n.ll (9th Cir. 1979).
97.
See, e.g., Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1062
(9th Cir. 1999).
98.
Id. ("Although there is no source confusion in the sense that consumers know they
are patronizing West Coast rather than Brookfield, there is nevertheless initial interest
confusion in the sense that, by using 'moviebuff.com' or 'MovieBuff to divert people looking for
'MovieBuff to its web site, West Coast improperly benefits from the goodwill that Brookfield
developed in its mark.").
99.
Rajzer, supra note 95 at 440 (noting Brookfield to be the first case to apply initial
interest confusion to in the Internet context).
100.
See Edina Realty, Inc. v. TheMLSonline.com, Civil No. 04-4371 (JRT/FLN), 2006
U.S. Dist LEXIS 13775, at *13 n.4 (D. Minn. Mar. 20, 2006) (listing cases in which the Second,
Third, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth, and Federal Circuits have applied the initial interest confusion
doctrine).
101.
See Rajzer, supra note 95, at 440.
102.
See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1062; see also Jason Allen Cody, Note, Initial Interest
Confusion: What Ever Happened to TraditionalLikelihood of Confusion Analysis?, 12 FED. CIR.
B.J. 643, 646-47 (2003) ('The initial interest confusion doctrine permits a court to find likelihood
of confusion even though the consumer is only initially confused and later becomes aware of the
source's actual identity.").
103.
See Rajzer, supra note 95, at 440 (internal citations omitted).

2010]

KEYWORD ADVERTISING

likelihood of confusion element of an infringement claim. 10 4 The
doctrine thus works toward fulfilling the trademark goal of protecting
the goodwill associated with a trademark 15 by focusing on the use of
another's trademark "in a manner calculated 'to capture initial
consumer attention."' 10 6
In keeping with this goal, some
commentators advocate that courts should restrict the application of
initial interest confusion to situations where "the companies' goods or
services are closely related and there is a realistic threat of
competitive damage."' 0 7 The focus on the capture of attention, rather
than on the likelihood of causing confusion, suggests a willingness by
courts to stretch the boundaries of the traditional application of
trademark law in order to grant the plaintiff a remedy.
2. Trademark Dilution Claims for Famous Marks
While trademark infringement claims do require proof of
likelihood of confusion, trademark dilution claims do not. The Federal
Trademark Dilution Act, incorporated in the Lanham Act, provides an
independent cause of action for dilution of famous marks that are
distinctive.10 8 A famous mark holder is
entitled to an injunction against another person who, at any time after the owner's mark
has become famous, commences use of a mark or trade name in commerce that is likely

104.
See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1062 (quoting Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA,
Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1405 (9th Cir. 1997)). Cf. Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Comm'cns Corp., 354
F.3d 1020, 1034-1035 (9th Cir. 2004) (Berzon, J., concurring) (arguing the Initial Interest
Confusion Doctrine should not apply to cases where the user "knows, or should know" from the
outset the true source of a website, and distinguishing between "hijacking" a potential customer
and merely distracting users with another choice).
105.
See Cody, supra note 102, at 662.
106.
Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1062 (quoting Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc.,
109 F.3d 1394, 1405 (9th Cir. 1997)).
107.
Cody, supra note 102, at 662 (quoting Bruce J. Maynard, Note, The Initial Interest
Confusion Doctrine and Trademark Infringement on the Internet, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1303,
1353 (2000)).
108.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2009). The statute defines a mark as famous "if it is widely
recognized by the general consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the
goods or services of the mark's owner," and lays out four criteria to consider in determining
whether a mark is famous: (i) "The duration, extent, and geographic reach of advertising and
publicity of the mark, whether advertised or publicized by the owner or third parties. (ii) The
amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales of goods or services offered under the mark. (iii)
The extent of actual recognition of the mark. (iv) Whether the mark was registered under the Act
of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register." Id. §
1125(c)(2)(A). Dilution can also be a remedy available under state law. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus.
LAW § 360-1 (Consol. 2009).
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to cause dilution ... of the famous mark, regardless of the presence
or absence of actual
10 9
or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic injury.

Famous mark holders thus are not required to show confusion as an
element of a trademark claim for dilution under the Act. A dilution
claim is based on the idea that a trademark can lose its ability to
clearly distinguish its source when unauthorized use occurs. 110
Accordingly, the law is meant to protect against the "gradual whittling
away of a firm's distinctive trade-mark or name." '
Since dilution
claims are only available for famous marks, non-famous marks may
only pursue relief under the Lanham Act through an infringement
claim, which, as previously discussed, requires a showing of a
likelihood of confusion.
3. Non-infringing Uses and Defenses
Trademark law does not confer a right to issue a blanket
prohibition on the use of a registered mark, but rather only prohibits
the use of it "so far as to protect the owner's good will against the sale
of another's product as his."11 2 Trademark law embodies two main
types of defenses under the doctrine of fair use, one found in the
statute and the other a development of case law. Section 1115(b)(4) of
the Lanham Act allows for use of another's mark when the mark is
used in good faith not "in a trademark sense ... but rather only to
describe the user's goods or services or their geographic origin."1 1 3 In
other words, the defense allows third parties to use the trademark to
accurately describe a characteristic of their own goods. 114 This use
encompasses comparative advertising, in which companies use others'

109.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (emphasis added).
110.
Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 521 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting Hormel
Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., 73 F.3d 497, 506 (2d Cir. 1996)).
111.
Id. (quoting Allied Maint. Corp v. Allied Mech. Trades, Inc., 369 N.E.2d 1162, 1166
(N.Y. 1977)).
112.
Alicia Gamez, Note, WhenUcom, Inc. & Google Inc.: Parsing Trademark's Use
Requirement, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 403, 406 (2006) (quoting Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264
U.S. 359, 368 (1924)).
113.
15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4); Rajzer, supra note 95, at 435 (internal citations omitted). The
Act also lists certain specific allowed uses with regard to a dilution claim, including use for the
purposes of comparative advertising and identification, or parody and criticisms. 15 U.S.C. §
1125(c)(3).
114.
See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Pubfg, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir.
1992). Further limitations on liability are detailed in 15 US.C. § 1114(2), encompassing mainly
innocent publishers and printers.
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trademarks to distinguish themselves from their competitors. 115 A
well-known example of such comparative advertising would be the
popular Apple television ads that mention Microsoft's trademarked
software programs "Vista" and "Windows" as a way to distinguish
Apple from Microsoft. 116 Such uses are permissible because the
advertiser is not attempting to capitalize on consumer confusion or to
deceive the public as to the source of a product 1 7 and because it is
difficult to refer to a trademarked product without using the
trademark itself. Another type of fair use, nominative fair use, applies
where a defendant uses the trademark holder's mark to describe the
holder's product, though the user's main purpose is to describe his own
product. 118 An example of nominative fair use is a car repair shop's
use of the term "Volkswagen" to indicate it repairs Volkswagen
vehicles. 119
4. Summary
In order to prevail on a Lanham Act infringement claim, a
plaintiff must show that (a) the defendant's use of the trademark was
a use in commerce as defined by the Act and (b) the use caused a
likelihood of confusion. 12 0 In analyzing infringement claims in the
Internet search engine context, some courts have chosen to apply the
initial interest confusion doctrine, rather than the traditional
confusion analysis. 12 1 This doctrine rejects multi-factored attempts to
determine the existence of genuine consumer confusion, instead
reaching a finding of a likelihood of confusion based on potential for
consumer diversion. 122

115.
See, e.g., Diversified Mktg., Inc. v. Estee Lauder, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 128, 130, 132
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding the phrase "If You Like Estee Lauder... You'll Love Beauty USA" to be
lawful comparative advertising). See also Sarah J. Givan, Using Trademarks as Location Tools
on the Internet: Use in Commerce?, 2005 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 4,
52; Rajzer, supra note 95, at
435.
116.
Video clips of Apple's television ads are available at Get a Mac: Watch the TV Ads,
www.apple.com/getamac/ads (last visited Dec. 20, 2009). Ads referring to Microsoft's Vista
software by name include those on the website entitled "Broken Promises" (2009) and "Choose a
Vista" (2007). Id.
117.
New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 307-08.
118.
MCCARTIrn, supra note 5, § 23:11 (quoting Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d
1139, 1151 (9th Cir. 2002)).
119.
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Church, 411 F.2d 350, 351-52 (9th Cir. 1969).
120.
See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
121.
See supra note 97.
122.
See supra notes 101-104 and accompanying text.
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Initial interest confusion thus is particularly well-suited for
targeting uses of trademarks by websites selling goods that are closely
related to those of the mark holder, which could result in a
123
competitive threat to the mark holder if consumer diversion occurs.
This type of diversion is the central issue in keyword advertising
cases: a competitor is attempting to divert consumers by reaping the
goodwill of a trademark held by another.124 Therefore, initial interest
confusion should be used as a vehicle for shifting the focus of these
cases from traditional source confusion to goodwill, as the following
sections will discuss.

II. ANALYSIS: WHY CONFUSION SHOULD NOT BE THE Focus OF
KEYWORD ADVERTISING CLAIMS

A. Purpose and History of the Confusion Requirement in the
Development of Trademark Law
Abandoning the requirement of the likelihood of consumer
confusion in a trademark claim is an extreme proposition, since
consumer confusion is considered the "touchstone" of an infringement
claim. 125 However, some courts' willingness to find a likelihood of
confusion on the basis of a capture and diversion of consumers'
interest-rather than actual confusion-is evidence that courts want
to find a way to protect the value attached to the mark itself,126 as
opposed to concentrating on consumers' interests alone and giving
little or no weight to the mark's inherent value. In order to fully
understand why it is wrong to focus on confusion as the mainstay of a
keyword advertising trademark claim, the purpose and history of the
confusion requirement, along with the policy goals of trademark law,
must be examined.
Trademark law was developed with dual policy goals in mind:
to protect the trademark owner's interest in not having the "fruit of
his labor misappropriated" on the one hand and to shield the public
27
from deception by illegitimate retailers on the other. 1

123.
See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
124.
See, e.g., Soilworks, LLC v. Midwest Indus. Supply, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1132
(D. Ariz. 2008) ("Soilworks admits that its intent in using the phrase 'soil sement' [as keywords
and metatags] on the Internet was to trade off Midwest's goodwill in its Soil-Sement mark by
diverting potential customers to Soilworks' Soiltac product.").
125. MCCARTIry, supra note 5, § 23:1.
126.
See discussion infra Part II.B.3.
127.
MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 2:1 (internal quotation omitted).
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1. Protecting the Public from Deception
The requirement of proving a likelihood of confusion in a
trademark infringement claim reflects the interest of protecting the
public from deceptive retailers and focuses on the public's role as
consumer in the marketplace. 128 An essential function of a trademark
is to distinguish the source or sponsorship of goods; 12 9 therefore, when
a trademark is used in an infringing manner, it "deprives consumers
of their ability to distinguish among the goods of competing
manufacturers" and creates a problem of misinformation. 3 0 Because
any infringement analysis must determine whether the trademark use
is deceptive to consumers, the consumer's state of mind is paramount
in a trademark infringement suit, even though the consumer is not an
actual party to the suit. 131 Trademark law in this sense is a mode of
1 32
consumer protection.
The need to distinguish goods and services is directly tied to
consumers' desires to continue to buy goods and services that they like
instead of ones that they dislike. 133 When presented with an array of
choices, a consumer can look to a trademark as a reference for
determining which product he desires to purchase. 134 Assuming that
the consumer has a previous familiarity with a particular brand, the
trademark helps to reduce confusion between similar, or seemingly
similar, products and services by allowing the consumer to zero in on a
product displaying a mark familiar to him.1 35
Importantly, the
trademark does not merely help consumers distinguish products and
services, but serves as "the objective symbol of the good will that a
business has built up."1 36 This goodwill is what causes a consumer to
purchase a product time after time based on its name or source and is
considered to be inseparable from the mark itself.137 The ability of a
128.
See Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 157 (1989) ('The law of
unfair competition has its roots in the common-law tort of deceit: its general concern is with
protecting consumers from confusion as to source.") (emphasis in original); see also supra notes
87-96 and accompanying text (explanation of likelihood of confusion requirement).
129.
MCCARTIry, supra note 5, § 3:2.
130.
Id. § 2:33 (quoting Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844,
n.14 (1982)).
131.
Id. § 2:33.

132.
133.
would have
134.
135.

Id.
Id. § 3:2 ('Without the identification function performed by trademarks, buyers
no way of returning to buy products that they have used and liked.").
Id.
Id.

136.

Id.

137.

See STIM, supra note 5.
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mark to cause a favorable psychological reaction in a consumer is of
38
undeniable value to the mark's owner.
2. Protecting the Trademark's Goodwill
Even if a consumer is not confused as to the source or sponsor
of an advertisement, if the consumer chooses to visit an advertised
website that appears only because the trademark keyword has been
purchased by the advertiser, the advertiser has used the goodwill
associated with the trademark to steal consumers. While some means
of capitalizing on the name recognition of another's brand are
considered permissive advertising, such as retail stores' placement of
the store-brand product next to a brand name product, keyword
advertising cases are different in that the advertiser has intentionally
purchased a competitor's specific trademark as a trigger for its
advertisement. 1 39
The argument that such a use of another's
trademark is akin to product placement in a brick and mortar retail
store is untenable because, in a retail store, a consumer is able to
compare different products side by side and choose the one he prefers.
In contrast, on the Internet, a consumer can only view one website at
a time.
Therefore, once the consumer has arrived at a brand's
website, he does not have the benefit of viewing multiple products.
The owner of the trademark that is being used as a search term is
thus deprived of a visitor to its site. Even if the consumer quickly
realizes his error and navigates to the trademark owner's site, the
trademark owner has still been harmed by the diversion of the
consumer. Moreover, the search engine profits when competitors bid
to have their ads appear at the top of the Sponsored Link list for a
certain keyword, 140 thus indirectly benefitting from the usurpation of
the goodwill. 14 1 Focusing on a defendant's intent in misappropriating
the goodwill of a trademark and the intent to deceive consumers,
rather than whether consumers are actually deceived, realigns
trademark litigation with the goal of protecting the interests of the
producer.

138.

MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 2:15.

139.
See, e.g.,
Soilworks, LLC v. Midwest Indus. Supply, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1132
(D. Ariz. 2008) ("Soilworks admits that its intent in using the phrase 'soil sement' [as keywords
and metatags] on the Internet was to trade off Midwest's goodwill in its Soil-Sement mark by
diverting potential customers to Soilworks' Soiltac product.").

140.

See supra notes 28, 29 and accompanying text.

141.

See supra notes 101-102 and accompanying text.
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According to Professor Mark McKenna, the focus on consumer
confusion is a product of modern trademark law and was never a part
of the original designs behind trademark policy. 142 Under this view,
those who criticize the expansion of trademark law and claim that it
has departed from its roots of protecting consumers and increasing
information available in the marketplace misunderstand the true
original goals of trademark law. 143 Through an analysis of early
trademark law cases, McKenna demonstrates that trademark law
originally intended to prevent trade diversion, not consumer
confusion. 144 That is, trademark law in the nineteenth century viewed
trademarks as property-like interests and sought to "prevent
competitors from dishonestly diverting customers who otherwise
would have gone to the senior user of a mark."' 45 However, by the
twentieth century, this traditional approach gave way to the modern
approach under which courts view "the possibility of consumer
confusion as an evil in itself."' 46 Therefore, characterizing the harm of
keyword-triggered sponsored links as trade diversion actually brings
trademark law back to its original formulations. In addition, viewing
trademarks as property makes sense in this context because the mark
is an extension of the goods or services to which it attaches. Just as
the trademarked good belongs to the mark holder, so should the mark
itself, at least to the extent it would enable a mark holder to prevent
others from using its mark to draw consumers from the mark holder.
B. Rescuecom, InitialInterest Confusion and the Focus on a Mark's
Goodwill
In analyzing cases where a competitor purchases the plaintiffs
trademark as a keyword trigger but the mark does not appear in the
text of the ad, courts should focus on the competitor's unfair
advantage and harm to the goodwill of the mark, rather than on
whether actual consumer confusion has been caused-which would be
almost impossible to prove when the trademark does not appear in the
ad text. With its 2009 decision in Rescuecom Corporation v. Google,

142.
Mark P. McKenna, The Norniative Foundationsof Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1839, 1840-41 (2007).
143.
Id. at 1841.
144.
See generally id. at 1849-70 (discussing the early English and American trademark
cases' focus on protecting the producer's interest, with benefits to the consumer only an added
benefit of trademark law, rather than its focus).
145.
Id. at 1843.
146.
Id.
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Inc., the Second Circuit harmonized the Courts of Appeals on the issue
of whether the use of trademarks as triggers in keyword advertising
qualifies as a use in commerce under the Act.147 With courts now in
agreement that the use of trademarks in this context does qualify as
an actionable trademark use, infringement claims now will boil down
to the question of whether the sponsored link at issue causes a
likelihood of consumer confusion. The development of the initial
interest confusion doctrine, however, shows that courts are less
concerned with the concept of confusion itself than with consumer
diversion, as discussed below. This is the correct approach because a
focus on confusion would overshadow a central question of these
trademark claims, namely, whether the third party is free riding on
148
the goodwill of the trademark holder.
1. 1-800 Contacts: A Narrow Interpretation of the Use in Commerce
Requirement
Until 2009, courts in the Second Circuit had narrowly
interpreted the Lanham Act's use in commerce requirement, refusing
to deem the use of trademarks in keyword advertising an actionable
trademark use irrespective of whether the defendant was a purchaser
or seller of a keyword. 149 In doing so, these courts relied on the
reasoning of a 2005 case from the Second Circuit involving pop-up
advertising, 15 0 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., where the
147.
See supra note 21 and accompanying text. This is true at least among Courts of
Appeals that have addressed the issue.
148.
"Free riding" is generally used in this Note to refer to conduct aimed to capitalize on
the goodwill, reputation and/or recognition of a popular, well-known brand by a less successful
brand. See MCCARTIrn, supra note 5, § 2:4.
In economic parlance, the infringer who ;reaps where he has not sown,' would be
known as a 'free rider.' As applied to the law of trademarks, the infringer is taking a
free ride on the senior user's mark and reputation by deceiving customers as to source
and quality. Such a 'free rider' is an economic parasite who must be enjoinable by the
law. If such an infringer is not enjoinable, the quality encouragement function is
destroyed. If all may take a free ride on the successful seller's mark and reputation,
there is no incentive to distinguish one's own goods and services.
Id.
149.
See Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 393 (N.D.N.Y. 2006), vacated
and remanded, 562 F. 3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009), and Merck & Co., Inc. v. Mediplan Health
Consulting, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) for examples in which the court ruled in
favor of the defendant and refused to deem trademark use in keyword advertising as an
actionable use.
150.
See, e.g., Rescuecom Corp., 456 F. Supp. 2d 393, 403 (holding that internal use is not
an actionable use, and emphasizing that no goods were passed off by defendant as emanating
from the trademark holder); Merck & Co., Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d 425, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(comparing internal use of keywords to product placement marketing strategies); S & L
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court found no actionable trademark use by defendant's software
program, which triggered pop-up advertisements of the plaintiffs
competitors to appear on the computer screen when the computer user
visited the plaintiffs website. 1 1 The plaintiffs website addresswhich in this case also contained the trademark of plaintiffs
company-was listed in an internal directory of websites compiled by
the defendant for the software, and 1-800 Contacts argued that listing
their trademarked web address name in the directory to trigger a popup ad constituted a use in commerce. 1 2 In rejecting the trademark
claim, the court emphasized that the plaintiffs trademark did not
actually appear in WhenU.com's pop-up ads and WhenU.com did not
allow its advertising clients "to request or purchase specified
keywords" as triggers for advertisements. 153
To the court, the
marketing strategy of WhenU.com's software was comparable to the
practice of product placement in retail stores where generic brands are
intentionally placed next to name brands in order to capitalize on the
name recognition of the competitor. 154 Applying the precedent of 1800 Contacts to the keyword advertising context, lower courts in the
Second Circuit refused to find trademark infringement when the use
of the trademark was not visible to the public and was not used to
represent the source or sponsorship of products.1
The court's
position in 1-800 Contacts was an outlier among the Courts of
Appeals, several of which later criticized the Second Circuit's
reasoning in the case and ruled that the use of trademarks in keyword
advertising was a use in commerce. 156
Vitamins, Inc. v. Austl. Gold, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 2d 188, 199-202 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding that
internal use of a trademark does not constitute trademark use within the meaning of the
Lanham Act); see also Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (listing
cases that have followed 1-800 Contacts).
151.
414 F.3d 400, 404-05 (2d Cir. 2005).
152.
1-800 Contacts, Inc., 414 F.3d at 409.
153.
Id.
154.
Id. at 411.
155.
See Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (listing cases
that have followed 1-800 Contacts).
156.
N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1219-20 (11th Cir.
2008) (calling the Second Circuit's reasoning in 1-800 Contacts "questionable" and holding that
the use of a third party competitor's trademark in website metatags, along with the display of
the competitor's trademark in a search result description of defendant's site, constituted "use"
under the Lanham Act). District courts across different circuits had also rejected the Second
Circuit's 1-800 Contacts reasoning as inappropriate or inconclusive as applied to the keyword
advertising context, or simply found an actionable trademark use was apparent for other
reasons. See, e.g., Mkt. Am. v. Optihealth Prods., Inc., No. 1:07CV00855, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
95337, at *18-19 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 21, 2008); J.G. Wentworth, S.S.C. Ltd. P'ship v. Settlement
Funding LLC, Civil Action No. 06-0597, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 288, *14-16 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4,
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2. Rescuecom: Resolving the Issue of Use
Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc. clarified the Second Circuit's
view on the use in commerce issue and brought it in line with the
other circuits. 157 In that case, the court distinguished the pop-up
advertising at issue in 1-800 Contacts from keyword advertising,
holding that Google's practice of recommending, offering, and selling
Rescuecom's trademarks as keyword advertising triggers amounted to
a use in commerce under the Lanham Act. 158 Rescuecom had sued
Google for trademark infringement, alleging that Google's sale of
Rescuecom's trademark as a keyword-which Google had specifically
recommended to Rescuecom's competitors through its Keyword
Suggestion
Tool-deceived
customers
into
thinking
the
1
9
advertisements were sponsored by Rescuecom.
The court stated
that 1-800 Contacts was not meant to imply that an internal, nonvisible use of a trademark in a software program's or website's
internal directory, such as in Google's internal search algorithm,
precludes a finding of trademark use.160
Further, whereas the
defendant in 1-800 Contacts had not used, displayed, or even sold
trademarks to advertisers, Google actively displayed, offered, and sold
Rescuecom's mark to Google's advertising customers and encouraged
16 1
its purchase through the Keyword Suggestion Tool.
The court also rejected the product placement analogy,
distinguishing between benign product placement that does not cause
consumer confusion and a retailer being paid "to arrange product
display and delivery in such a way that customers seeking to purchase
a famous brand would receive the off-brand, believing they had gotten
the brand they were seeking."1 62 The court stated that Rescuecom's
allegation that Google's display of sponsored links of competing brands
created a likelihood of consumer confusion as to trademarks was

2007); Edina Realty, Inc. v. TheMLSonline.com, Civil No. 04-4371 (JRT/FLN), 2006 U.S. Dist
LEXIS 13775, at *10 (D. Minn. Mar. 20, 2006) ('While not a conventional 'use in commerce,'
defendant nevertheless uses the Edina Realty mark commercially [by purchasing] search terms
that include the Edina Realty mark to generate its sponsored [advertisements].") (does not
mention 1-800 Contacts).
157.
See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
158.
Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009).
159.
Id. at 126-27.
160.
Id. at 129-30.
161.
Id. at 129.
162.
Id. at 130.
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sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. 163 Accordingly, it reversed
164
the lower court's dismissal of the case.
By resolving the issue of use, the Rescuecom decision brings the
issue of likelihood of confusion, the other main obstacle to a trademark
infringement claim,1 6 to the forefront of a keyword advertising
claim.1 66 Still, it will be challenging for Rescuecom or other similarly
situated plaintiffs to prove that a sponsored link is likely to cause
consumer confusion, making the victory a hollow one. Because the
advertiser's use of the trademark is often hidden from view,1 67 the
traditional confusion approach is not appropriate.
Courts will
eventually have to decide how to address the consumer confusion
prong of an infringement claim when faced with cases arising out of
the keyword context.
Courts should choose the initial interest
confusion approach, since its focus on consumer diversion is more
applicable to the keyword advertising context where competitors seek
to divert consumers,1 68 but not necessarily to deceive or confuse them.

3. Initial Interest Confusion: A Shortcut Around the Traditional
Likelihood of Confusion Analysis
Focusing on the defendant's intent and the harm to the
goodwill of the mark is more appropriate than focusing on confusion in
situations where the sponsored ad does not contain the purchased
trademark in the text of the ad. When the competing advertisement
does not actually display the purchased trademark, the ad's mere
163.
Id. at 131.
164.
Id.
165.
See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
166.
See Posting of Eric Goldman (Graeme Dinwoodie on Rescuecom v. Google) to
Technology & Marketing Law Blog, http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2OO9/O4/graeme
dinwoodi.htm (Apr. 15, 2009, 07:28 EST) (quoting Professor Graeme Dinwoodie as saying that, in
the Rescuecom decision, "the Second Circuit has decided to opt for analysis of 'confusion' over
,use', and has decided that we should litigate the scope of trademark law, with due regard for
context."').
167.
The use at issue when advertisers purchase search terms is the sale itself of a search
term that is identical to a trademark name. This use is a transaction between a search engine
and the advertiser and, when the advertiser does not display the purchased trademarked term in
the text of its ad, the only appearance of the trademark term comes from the consumer's typing it
into the search box.
168.
See, e.g., Soilworks, LLC v. Midwest Indus. Supply, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1132
(D. Ariz. 2008) ("Soilworks admits that its intent in using the phrase 'soil sement' [as keywords
and metatags] on the Internet was to trade off Midwest's goodwill in its Soil-Sement mark by
diverting potential customers to Soilworks' Soiltac product.").
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appearance alongside search results may seem harmless and one
could argue that such ads are not confusing to most computer users,
as Google maintains. 169 However, it would be wrong to conclude that
no infringement has occurred. Drawing consumers by purchasing
another's trademark as a keyword misappropriates the goodwill of the
trademark holder and runs contrary to the expectations of
consumers. 170 While a defendant's intent in using the plaintiffs mark
171
it
has always been a factor in the likelihood of confusion analysis,
should be given special prominence in the keyword advertising
context, because of the quasi-bad faith nature of using another's
trademark-and its goodwill-to promote a competing business. It
should be presumed that a defendant who places an ad triggered by a
another party's trademark desires to divert customers to his website,
and does so through illicit free riding, unless the criteria for fair
trademark use are satisfied.
The development of the initial interest confusion doctrine
shows that courts are already moving in this direction. 172 While the

initial interest confusion doctrine is still technically considered part of
the confusion analysis, it focuses more on the goodwill behind a mark
than on a consumer's actual confusion. 173 Courts that have applied
the doctrine to the Internet context view an advertiser's intent to
misappropriate the goodwill of a trademark as a significant factor in
showing a likelihood of confusion.174 Though some courts applying the
doctrine continue to require a more searching determination of
confusion before finding infringement, 171 other courts will impose
169.
Helft, supra note 11.
170.
See Venture Tape Corp. v. McGills Glass Warehouse, 540 F.3d 56, 61-62 (1st Cir.
2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1622 (2009) (finding infringement in a metatags case in part due to
the defendant's subjective intent to trade on the plaintiffs reputation).
171.
MCCARTY, supra note 5, § 23:11.
172.
See Cody, supra note 102, at 659 (explaining that the initial interest confusion
doctrine "attempts to prevent a junior user of a mark from misappropriating the goodwill of a
trademark owner and from securing an advantage otherwise unavailable," and that courts
applying the doctrine recognize that consumers are not confused about the identity of the seller).
173.
Id.
174.
Id.; Austl. Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 1239 (10th Cir. 2006) ("Defendants
used the goodwill associated with Plaintiffs' trademarks in such a way that consumers might be
lured to the lotions from Plaintiffs' competitors. This is a violation of the Lanham Act.")
(metatags case).
175.
See, e.g., Designer Skin, LLC v. S & L Vitamins, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 2d 811, 817-20 (D.
Ariz. 2008) (finding that defendant internet reseller's use of plaintiffs trademarks did not cause
initial interest confusion when used to accurately describe contents of website, and emphasizing
that deception is an essential element of initial interest confusion); see also Jamie N. Nafziger,
Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Keyword Advertising After Rescuecom: Predictability Remains Elusive 6
(2009), http://www.dorsey.com/files/upload/nafziger keyword advertising cle.pdf.

KEYWORD ADVERTISING

2010]

liability based on the potential for harm caused by consumer diversion
in itself.176 The doctrine posits that harm to the trademark owner
occurs when a consumer is diverted to a competitor's site, even if the
177
consumer does not end up making a purchase on the other's site.
Indeed, one justification for its application is that the trademark's
goodwill is harmed as a result of the initial credibility the consumer
may attach to the infringer's products or services, "customer
consideration that otherwise may be unwarranted and that may be
built on the strength of the protected mark, reputation[,] and
goodwill."'

178

The Ninth Circuit has singled out three factors from the
traditional likelihood of confusion analysis as most important to a
determination of initial interest confusion, evidence of actual
confusion not being one of them. 79 The three factors considered to be
the most significant, known as the "internet trinity," are "(1) the
similarity of the marks, (2) the relatedness of the goods or services,
and (3) the parties' simultaneous use of the Web as a marketing
channel."1 80 When an application of these three factors suggests that
confusion is likely, the other factors in the traditional Sleekcraft
likelihood of confusion analysis must "weigh strongly" in favor of the
defendant in order to avoid a finding of infringement.1 81 Notably,
these three factors will almost always be met in the keyword
advertising context where a defendant purchases a competitor's
1 82
trademark as a trigger for the defendant's advertisement.
Lower courts in the Ninth Circuit have based a determination
of likelihood of confusion on a satisfaction of these three factors alone
when the defendant fails to present evidence in his favor on the

176.
See, e.g., Storus Corp. v. Aroa Marketing, Inc., No. C-06-2454 MMC, 2008 WL
449835, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2008) (rejecting defendant's argument that a likelihood of
confusion did not exist because of an absence of source confusion once consumer's arrived at
defendant's site, noting that "under the 'initial interest confusion' theory of trademark liability,
,source confusion' need not occur; rather, in the internet context, the wrongful act is the
defendant's use of the plaintiffs mark to 'divert' consumers to a website that 'consumers know' is
not Storus' website").
177.
See Austl. Gold, Inc.,, 436 F.3d at 1239 (metatag case).

178.

Id.

179.
Interstellar Starship Servs, Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 304 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2002).
180.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
181.
Id. (internal citations omitted). See supra note 95 and accompanying text for the rest
of the Sleekcraft factors.
182.
See Nafziger, supra note 175, at 7.
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remaining confusion factors. 83 In Storus Corp. v.Aroa Marketing,
Inc., the court held that evidence that some web visitors clicked on
defendant's advertisements and visited defendant's website was
sufficient to satisfy the three-factored test, noting that "under the
'initial interest confusion' theory of trademark liability, 'source
confusion' need not occur; rather, in the internet context, the wrongful
act is the defendant's use of the plaintiffs mark to 'divert'
consumers."'1 4 Similarly, the court in Soilworks, LLC v. Midwest
Indus. Supply, Inc. used the "Internet trinity" factors to determine
that the defendant, who used plaintiffs trademarks in keywords and
metatags, intended to divert potential consumers and trade off
plaintiffs goodwill.185
These courts have essentially eliminated
evidence of actual confusion from the likelihood of confusion analysis.
These cases are only the most recent illustration of courts'
focus on consumer diversion and misappropriation of goodwill in the
Internet context. In 2004, a year before the Second Circuit's 1-800
Contacts decision, the Ninth Circuit held in Playboy Enterprises, Inc.
u. Netscape Communications Corp. that a search engine's use of
trademarked keywords as triggers for advertising was a "use in
commerce" and that the intent to divert customers from a competitor
through such use could amount to trademark infringement. 86 The
case arose when Playboy sued Netscape and Excite, Inc. for
programming banner advertisements for adult-oriented companies to
appear next to search results when a user entered plaintiffs
87
trademarks "Playboy" and "Playmate" into the search engine.
Playboy argued that the defendant search engine misappropriated the
goodwill of its trademarks by diverting consumers to competitors'
8
sites. 8
The court stated outright that linking advertisements to
plaintiffs trademarks was a use in commerce. 8 9 The court held that a
fact issue existed with regard to confusion and that the defendants'
use was at least suggestive of an intent to confuse, since Netscape did
not do anything to prevent the confusion and even profited from it

183.
See, e.g., Storus Corp. v. Aroa Marketing, Inc., No. C-06-2454 MMC, 2008 WL
449835, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2008); Soilworks, LLC v. Midwest Indus. Supply, Inc., 575 F.
Supp. 2d 1118, 1131 (D. Ariz. 2008)..
184.
Storus Corp., 2008 WL 449835, at *4.
185.
Soilworks, LLC, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 1131.
186.
354 F.3d 1020, 1031 (9th Cir. 2004).
187.
Id. at 1023.
188.
Id. at 1023, 1025.
189.
Id. at 1024, 1032.
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when consumers visited the advertised links. 190 Based on initial
interest confusion alone, the court held that a strong overall likelihood
of confusion existed since the ads were not clearly labeled as
advertisements unaffiliated with Playboy, causing the possibility that
site visitors would click through to the advertisement, thinking the
link to be an ad for Playboy. 191 As the court plainly stated,
Some consumers, initially seeking [Playboy's] sites, may initially believe that unlabeled
banner advertisements are links to [Playboy's] sites or to sites affiliated with [Playboy].
Once they follow the instructions to "click here," and they access the site, they may well
realize that they are not at a [Playboy] -sponsored site. . . [However,] [t]he Internet user
will have reached the 19
[advertised]
site because of defendants' use of [Playboy's] mark.
2
Such use is actionable.

Playboy is a prime example of a court's applying the initial interest
confusion doctrine to find an actionable trademark use in the keyword
advertising context on the basis of a defendant's misappropriation of
the goodwill associated with a trademark, irrespective of whether
harm to the consumer occurs.
In sum, courts applying the initial interest confusion doctrine
essentially determine likelihood of confusion by focusing on whether
the advertisement caused any consumers to arrive at the competitor's
site, with little emphasis on how long the consumer stayed there or
whether the consumer actually was confused about the sponsor of the
website. 193 As the Seventh Circuit noted in a case where a competitor
used the plaintiffs trademarks in the metatags of his website in order
to attract plaintiffs consumers to his site, "What is important is not
the duration of the confusion, it is the misappropriation of [the
trademark owner's] goodwill."1 94 Similarly, the First Circuit has held
that, when an advertiser's purpose in using a competitor's trademark
is to attract customers to its site, there is no genuine dispute as to

190.
Id. at 1028.
191.
Id. at 1023, 1027.
192.
Id. at 1026. The court also rejected the defendants' assertions of nominative fair use,
finding that defendants could use other marks besides the plaintiffs trademarks to trigger the
adult-oriented advertising, and therefore, use of the mark was not necessary to identify a
product or service that is "not readily identifiable without use of the trademark," a requirement
under the court's nominative fair use test. Id. at 1029-30.
193.
See, e.g., Austl. Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 1238-40 (10th Cir. 2006) (using
the doctrine of initial interest to find that defendant's purchase of plaintiffs trademarks as
keywords and use of the trademarks in metatags caused a likelihood of consumer confusion).
194.
Promatek Indus., LTD v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 812-13 (7th Cir. 2002)
(affirming plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction against defendant based on an initial
interest confusion analysis of plaintiffs trademark infringement claim).
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likelihood of confusion. 195 In a case involving a defendant's purchase
of another's trademarks as keywords and the use of the keywords in
metatags on defendant's site, the Tenth Circuit affirmed a five million
dollar verdict for plaintiffs, emphasizing that, "Defendants used the
goodwill associated with Plaintiffs' trademarks in such a way that
consumers might be lured to the [products of] Plaintiffs' competitors.
This is a violation of the Lanham Act."' 196
Aside from arguing initial interest confusion, a trademark
plaintiff could also choose to base its claim on dilution, rather than
infringement. The use of dilution as a cause of action in keyword
infringement cases would go a step beyond initial interest confusion
by not just sidestepping the issue of actual confusion, but avoiding it
altogether since a federal dilution claim does not require a showing of
confusion. 197 The theory behind a dilution claim is that marks lose
value even in the absence of consumer confusion "because the value of
the mark is the consumer association with product quality."'9 8 While

a cause of action for dilution remains a viable mode of protection in
the keyword advertising context, its use is restricted to those marks
that meet the threshold for being considered famous under the
Lanham Act. 99 However, some mode of protection is also necessary
for marks that may not meet the threshold for being considered
famous under the Lanham Act but are still well-known enough that
users are intentionally searching for the mark names and competitors
are intentionally purchasing the search term as a keyword trigger.
There is no reason that owners of trademarks that fall within this
category should have to prove the added obstacle of confusion in order
to obtain relief under the Act, while owners of famous marks do not.
Moreover, smaller companies (which would presumably be less wellknown, and thus would not qualify as famous under the Act) that
cannot afford to outbid other advertisers are arguably the ones most in
need of protection. If a company is outbid on its own trademark, it
cannot post an advertisement when its trademark is used as a search
term. If this occurs, small companies would be precluded from having

195.
See Venture Tape Corp. v. McGills Glass Warehouse, 540 F.3d 56, 62 (1st Cir. 2008),
cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1622 (2009).
196.
Austl. Gold, Inc., 436 F.3d at 1231, 1239.
197.
See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
198.
Erich D. Schiefelbine, Stopping a Trojan Horse: ChallengingPop-up Advertisements
and Embedded Software Schemes on the Internet Through Unfair Competition Laws, 19 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 499, 517-18 (2003).

199.

See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
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access to the powerful advertising venue of a site like Google if their
20 0
trademarks are not adequately protected.

III.

LOOKING OUTSIDE THE

U.S.: FOREIGN LAW & DECISIONS

In attempting to prescribe a rule of law regarding advertising
in the Internet context, foreign laws and judicial decisions should be
20 1
taken into account. Due to the global nature of the Internet,
trademark laws for keyword advertising should be uniform across
national boundaries so that plaintiffs can expect the same protection
20 2
for their marks irrespective of where the infringement occurs.
Different search engine advertising policies for different countries
means that advertisers can skirt the restrictions of one country by
simply advertising on a search engine's foreign version of its website
20 3
and waiting for domestic consumers to see the ad on that website.
In other words,"[i]f an adword buyer in France can circumvent the
trademark decisions of its home courts by purchasing trademarked
adwords from www.google.com in the United States and then waiting
for French buyers to use the American site, the result undercuts
international efforts to ensure protections for mark holders across
borders." 20 4 The prospect of a consumer visiting Google's main website
instead of a country-specific one is a more plausible scenario, because
of Google's universal ".com" domain. In either case, a strategic
advertiser can exploit the difference in policies on the Google websites
and continue to profit off the goodwill of the trademark holder by
simply advertising to a different Internet audience. 20 5 An attempt at
transnational harmonization of trademark law in this particular
context would be beneficial, as national boundaries on the Internet are
essentially nonexistent from the user's perspective, and advertising in

200.
See notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
201.
See Bains, supra note 2, at 113.
202.
Trademarks registered in the United States and infringed in another country are
still protected by U.S. law if the goods which display the foreign mark are imported into the
United States. When a mark is infringed on an Internet website that can be accessed in the
United States, the use may also constitute infringement in the United States. MCCARTHY, supra
note 5, § 29:56.
203.
Recent Development, Making Your Mark on Google, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 479, 491
(2005).
204.
Id.
205.
See supra Hansell, note 28 and accompanying text; supra note 178 and
accompanying text.
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a different country can be accomplished merely by changing a couple
206
of letters in Google's domain name.
An analysis of the judicial landscape in other common law
countries reveals that the element of confusion poses an equally
challenging obstacle to foreign plaintiffs, although the case law in
these countries is not as well developed as it is in the United States.
In 2009, UK courts first faced a case where a brand owner claimed
infringement directly against a competitor, rather than a search
engine. 20 7 In that case, Interflora, Inc. v. Marks & Spencer Plc, the
plaintiff, an operator of a flower delivery network, sued a flower
delivery service that was not part of the plaintiffs network. 208 The
defendant had purchased multiple keyword phrases containing the
plaintiffs "Interflora" mark as a trigger for its sponsored
advertisement. 209 The plaintiff alleged that, in competing with the
defendant to purchase its own trademark as an advertising trigger, in
order to prevent the defendant's ads from being triggered by the
plaintiffs trademark, the plaintiffs advertising costs increased
$750,000 over the course of a year. 210 In addition to arguing that the
defendant's acts amounted to use in the course of trade (a prerequisite
for a finding of infringement analogous to the Lanham Act's use in
commerce requirement) 211 and were likely to cause confusion, the
plaintiff also argued that, even if there was no likelihood of confusion,
the acts were detrimental to the distinctive character of the
trademarks and amounted to free riding on the reputation of the
marks at a direct cost to the plaintiff.2 12 Instead of rendering a
decision on the claims, the High Court of Justice chose to refer the
questions at issue to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the body
206.
The Country Code Top-Level Domain (ccTLD) appears at the end of a website
address to indicate the name of a country, such as ".es" for Spain. Google Spain therefore
operates under the domain name www.google.es; Google France likewise operates under
www.google.fr. See Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), Root Zone Database,
http://www.iana.org/domains/root/cctld/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2009) ('Country-code Top-level
Domains (ccTLDs) are two-letter top-level domains especially designated for a particular country
or autonomous territory to use to service their community.").
207.
[2009] EWHC (Ch) 1095 (Eng. and Wales), available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/
cases/EWHC/Ch/2009/1095.html.
208.
Id. at [11]-[13].
209.
Id. at [28]-[29].
210.
Id. at [31].
211.
The term "use in the course of trade" is not defined in the Trade Marks Act of 1994,
but the term "trade" is defined as "include [ing] any business or profession." See Trade Marks Act,
1994, c. 26, pt. 1, §§ 10, 103(1) (Eng.); TONY MARTINO, TRADEMARK DILUTION 90 (Oxford
University Press 1996).
212.
[2009] EWHC (Ch) 1095 at [47]-[49].
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responsible for ensuring that European Union legislation is applied
the same way in member states. 213 The European Union's position on
whether keyword advertising constitutes a use in commerce has not
been settled and several other national courts in the European Union
2 14
had similar questions pending on referral to the ECJ at the time.
In September 2009, the Advocate General of the ECJ issued an
advisory opinion in Google's favor on three keyword cases that had
been referred to the ECJ by French courts. 215 The opinion, which
addressed
whether
Google's AdWords
program
constitutes
infringement under European Union law, posited that Google does not
infringe trademarks by selling the marks as keywords and that the
mere display of sponsored links triggered by trademarks does not
amount to infringement. 21 6 The opinion rejected the claim that a
display of sponsored links causes a risk of confusion, noting that
"Google's search engine is no more than a tool: the link that it
establishes between keywords corresponding to trade marks and
natural results, even the more relevant sites, is not enough to lead to
confusion." 21 7 The opinion expressed a concern that a contrary ruling
would, in effect, amount to awarding trademark holders absolute

213.
Microsoft
Encarta
Online
Encyclopedia,
European
Court of Justice,
http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/features/dictionary/DictionaryResults.aspx?lextype=3&search=
european%20courto20ofo20justice (last visited Dec. 20, 2009). See also Council Directive, supra
note 61.
214.
Interflora, Inc., [2009] EWHC (Ch) 1095, at [93]; see also Update on Interflora vs
Marks & Spencer AdWords Trademark Row, JATINMAHINDRA.COM, Sept. 2, 2009,
http://www.jatinmahindra.com/2009/09/02/update-on-interflora-vs-marks-spencer-adwordstrademark-row/. For two earlier UK cases in which the courts found for the trademark
defendant, see Reed Executive Plc v. Reed Business Information Ltd., [2004] EWCA (Civ) 159,
[140], 2004 R.P.C. 40 (Eng. and Wales), available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/
2004/159.html and Wilson v. Yahoo! UK Ltd., [2008] EWHC (Ch) 361, [83], 2008 E.T.M.R. 33 (Ch
D) (Eng. and Wales), available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2008/361.html.
215.
Emma Barraclough, Google Wins Round One of ECJ Adwords Case, MANAGING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, Sept. 22, 2009, http://www.managingip.com/Article/2300732/Googlewins-round-one-of-E CJ-adwords-case.html.
216.
Id.
217.
Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, Joined Cases 236, 237, & 238/08,
Google France v. Louis Vuitton Malletier, Viaticum Luteciel, CNRRH,
89 (E.C.J. Sept. 22,
2009), available at http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=en&jurcdj=jurcdj&
newform=newform&docj=docj&docop=docop&docnoj=docnoj&typeord=ALLTYP&numaff=&
ddatefs=15&mdatefs=9&ydatefs=2009&ddatefe=22&mdatefe=9&ydatefe=2009&nomusuel=&
domaine=&mots=&resmax=100&Submit=Re (follow "C-236/08" hyperlink) [hereinafter Maduro
Opinion].
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rights in their marks.2 18 The advisory opinion is nonbinding, though
the ECJ usually follows such opinions in 80 percent of cases.

219

The French cases are distinguishable from Interflora, on which
the ECJ has yet to issue a decision. 220 The French cases all involved
claims against a search engine, rather than a competitor. 221 The
Advocate General's opinion also focused on consumer confusion,
whereas the crux of Interflora's claim is competitive bidding on
trademarks.2 22 The questions referred by Interflora specifically ask
the ECJ to address whether a search engine can refuse to allow a
brand owner to prohibit others from bidding on its name as a
keyword. 223 Any of these factors could cause the court to depart from
the advisory opinion's analysis in the French cases and rule in favor of
the trademark holder.
Canadian courts have encountered similar challenges applying
trademark law to the Internet, though they have yet to directly
address a keyword advertising infringement claim. In the closest case
on point, one Canadian court held in part that invisible trademark use
in the metatags of a website, without visually misleading or confusing
content on the website, could not amount to "passing off,"224 a tort

under Canadian law which requires proof of goodwill, deception
through misrepresentation, and actual or potential damage to the
plaintiff.225
In British Columbia Automobile Ass'n v. Office &
Professional Employees International Union, defendant Union
established a website to support a strike against the British Columbia
Automobile Association (BCAA) and included BCAA's trademarks in
218.
Id.
108-10.
219.
Michael Herman, Google Wins Latest Round in Brand Names Dispute, TIMES
ONLINE (UK), Sept. 22, 2009, http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/law/
article6844086.ece.
220.
Posting of Ann Bampton (Interflora versus Marks & Spencer Court Action) to
Interflora Blog, http://blog.interflora.co.uk/interflora-versus-marks-spencer-court-action/ (Sept.
29, 2009).
221.
Id.; supra note 207.
222.
Posting of Ann Bampton (Interflora versus Marks & Spencer Court Action) to
Interflora Blog, http://blog.interflora.co.uk/interflora-versus-marks-spencer-court-action/ (Sept.
29, 2009).

223.

Id.

224.
B.C. Auto. Ass'n v. Office & Prof1 Employees Int'l Union Local 378, No. C992100,
2001 B.C.T.C. LEXIS 51, at *21-24, 61 (B.C.S.C. Jan. 26, 2001), available at
http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/jdb-txt/sc/01/01/200IbcscO156.htm. The holding of this case is only
useful for purposes of analogy rather than direct application to the keyword advertising context
because the defendant here was not a search engine, an advertiser, or even anyone in
competition with the plaintiff. See id. at *7,39.
225.
DANIEL GERVAIS & ELIZABETH F. JUDGE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW IN
CANADA 296, 304 (2005).
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their metatags and domain names. 226 The court held the use was
simply a lawful way for the Union to attract web visitors and the
content on the site made it clear that the site was not endorsed by the
BCAA.22 7 The court refused to apply an initial interest confusion
analysis, stating, "The fact that the current [I]nternet site is not
associated with the [BCAA] is quickly apparent from looking at the
site." 228 Though duration of a visitor's confusion does not matter for
the purposes of initial interest confusion analysis, the court
emphasized the lack of commercial competition or close identity
between the parties, traditional factors in the confusion analysis. 229 In
dicta, the court implied that if the Union's site had been commercial in
nature and competitive with the BCAA, and if the marks used had
been identical to the BCAA's marks, the outcome of these claims
would likely have been different. 23 0 This suggests that the court might
treat a keyword advertising infringement claim differently and
perhaps apply initial interest confusion, at least when the defendant
is a competitor of the mark holder, because in that situation the
purchased keyword would likely be identical to the plaintiffs mark
and the commercial nature of the transaction would be more evident.
This examination of foreign case law is important in devising a
solution to the keyword advertising problem because Google appears
to modify its trademark policies in response to how receptive a
231
country's courts are to trademark claims against search engines.
For example, Yahoo!'s favorable decision in 2008 in Wilson v. Yahoo!
UK was likely a catalyst for Google's implementing a change in its
trademark policy for the UK and Ireland two months after the
decision was issued,2 32 despite the fact that the case did not even
squarely address the issue of the sale or purchase of a keyword

226.
B.C. Auto Ass'n, 2001 B.C.T.C. LEXIS 51 at *10, 16-19.
227.
Id. at *63-64.
228.
Id. at *61.
229.
Id. at *38-39; see also Rajzer, supra note 95, at 433 and accompanying text.
230.
B.C. Auto Ass'n, 2001 B.C.T.C. LEXIS 51 at *64 ("[T]he use of similar meta tags
unconnected to a defendant's business or operation might indicate deception and might be a
significant factor in determining if there is passing-off."). See also Teresa Scassa, Intellectual
Property on the Cyber-Picket Line: A Comment on British Columbia Automobile Assn. v. Office
and Professional Employee's International Union, Local 378, 39 ALBERTA L. REV. 934, 941
(2002). ('It is not clear how the use of identical meta tags would change the passing off analysis
in the present case, so long as such use did not result in misrepresentation .... It may be that
the use of identical meta tags would have to be actionable on some basis other than passing off,
such as trademark depreciation under s. 22 of the Trade-marks Act.").
231.
See supra note 62.
232.
Tebbutt, supra note 65, at 399-400.
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identical to a third party's trademark. 233 If the ECJ chooses to follow
the recent advisory opinion on the French keyword cases issued in
Google's favor, Google would likely react by lifting its prohibition on
bidding for trademarks held in France.2 34 Since there is no indication
that Google will proactively issue trademark policies that are more
favorable to trademark holders than a country's courts are, the ECJ
should seriously consider the effect of its ruling on trademark holders
235
and the online advertising community, not just on search engines.
In particular, foreign courts should emulate the lead taken by
domestic courts in moving towards an infringement analysis that
focuses on trade diversion and protecting the producer's interest
behind a mark, rather than placing so much emphasis on the issue of
consumer confusion.
IV. CONCLUSION

Keyword-triggered advertising presents unique challenges to
the application of trademark law. Courts both inside and outside the
U.S. have struggled to resolve the issues of trademark use and
consumer confusion in a way that promotes fair competition while also
giving effect to the trademark policies that protect the trademark
owner's rights, including those of the mark's reputation and goodwill.
Use of a competitor's trademark explicitly to generate business should
be viewed as an unfair form of competition because the trademark use
functionally amounts to free riding on the goodwill of a more wellknown or more popular brand. Therefore, rather than focusing on
actual source confusion and use, the goodwill and reputation of a
mark-and a defendant's intent in profiting from it-should become
the focal points of the infringement analysis of keyword advertising.
Focusing on the defendant's intent is also important for situations
where the well-known brand buys trademarks of a less familiar brand
in order to ensure that the well-known company's advertisements
appear in place of those for the lesser known brand. In such cases the
concern of free-riding is diminished (because free riding typically
arises in the reverse scenario, with an unpopular or unknown
company trying to capitalize on the recognition of a more successful
233.
See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
234.
See Atkins-Kriger, supra note 53 and accompanying text.
235.
As Advocate General Maduro warned, "It is no exaggeration to say that, if Google
were to be placed under such an unrestricted obligation [to prohibit the sale of trademarks as
keywords], the nature of the internet and search engines as we know it would change." See
Maduro Opinion, supra note 217, 122.
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brand), 23 6 but consumer diversion nonetheless still poses a genuine
threat to the mark holder.
Now that the circuits appear to agree that keyword advertising
constitutes a use in commerce, more cases should survive a motion to
dismiss since plaintiffs will be able to overcome this initial hurdle of
an infringement claim. 23 7 Under the current trademark regime,
though, even if the appropriate use is found, trademark owners must
still prove that the third party usage is likely to cause consumer
confusion. Plaintiffs often lose on the element of confusion when their
trademarks are used as triggers but are not visible to computer users
in the text of ads. While it may be true that most Internet users
ignore the ad banners that accompany search results, 2 38 the fact
remains that some users do click through to the advertisements. 23 9 In
those cases, the intentional trade diversion results in a profit to both
Google and the advertiser, who has introduced a new customer to his
site who arguably would never have arrived there if the advertiser had
not purchased the search term as a keyword. Even when the
consumer's visit to the advertised site is only transitory and the
consumer does not complete a purchase on the site, the harm to the
trademark has already occurred from the trade diversion triggered by
the mark itself.
While some courts' application of the initial interest confusion
doctrine appears to indicate a willingness to provide a remedy for
injury to goodwill and to shortcut the usual confusion analysis that
examines the existence of confusion as to the source of a good or
service, not all circuits have adopted the doctrine as part of the
likelihood of confusion analysis. 2 40
In any case, initial interest
confusion, while a temporary solution, is not a permanent resolution
to the issue; it is merely a launching pad for what should be a drive to
more strongly consider the goodwill associated with a mark and the
attempt by a competitor to unfairly reap this goodwill. Such an
approach makes sense where the advertiser and the trademark holder
are in a competing line of business and market similar products,

236.
See supra note 148.
237.
See supra note 165 and accompanying text; see also discussion supra Part I.B. 1.
238.
See Kaminer, supra note 23, at 48-49.
239.
See Storus Corp. v. Aroa Marketing, Inc., No. C-06-2454 MMC, 2008 WL 449835, at
*5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2008) (discussing evidence of the number of times that consumers clicked
on defendant's sponsored link after entering plaintiffs trademark as a search term).
240.
See Edina Realty, Inc. v. TheMLSonline.com, Civil No. 04-4371 (JRT/FLN), 2006
U.S. Dist LEXIS 13775, at *13 n.4 (D. Minn. Mar. 20, 2006); supra text accompanying notes 99100, 240.
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because this is when it is most beneficial for the advertiser to benefit
from the goodwill of the trademark holder.
Google has inhibited the development of unfavorable precedent
in the U.S. by settling lawsuits brought by trademark owners before
they reach the circuit level and by keeping the terms of the
settlements confidential.2 41 By settling, Google not only avoids
liability but also avoids verdicts that would require it to modify its
policies. Though trademark owners have the choice of whether to
settle or not, they often are induced to doing so to avoid long-term
litigation costs, particularly when faced with the prospect of
competing with Google in terms of available resources for funding
litigation.2 42 Moreover, from a practical standpoint, few trademark
owners are willing to sue Google in the first place due to the fact that
243
Google's vast resources make it an unattractive litigation target.
Therefore, a trademark holder's only viable recourse is to sue each and
every advertiser that has bought a keyword including its trademark.
Forcing a company to sue multiple infringers is a costly and inefficient
mechanism for ensuring trademark protection, and such inefficiencies
241.
See Mills, supra note 63 (discussing the unknown terms of American Blind's
settlement with Google); Posting of Eric Goldman (American Airlines and Google Settle Keyword
Advertising Lawsuit) to Technology & Marketing Law Blog, http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/
2008/07/american airlin l.htm (July 19, 2008, 09:05 EST); Posting of Eric Goldman (American
Blinds-Google Lawsuit Settles) to Technology & Marketing Law Blog, http://blog.ericgoldman.org/
archives/2007/08/american blinds 1.htm (Aug. 31, 2007, 16:43 EST); Larson, supra note 14;
Kevin Newcomb, Geico, Google Settle Trademark Dispute, CLICKZ, Sept. 8, 2005,
http://www.clickz.com/3547356.
242.
See American Blind Settles Out of Court with Google, INTERNET RETAILER, Sept. 5,
2007,
http://www.internetretailer.com/internet/marketing-conference/00096-american-blindsettles -out-court- google.html (quoting American Blind CEO's explanation of the company's
decision to settle with Google: "We didn't want to have to fight this for the next 20 years or until
Congress decides to act."). See also Miguel Helft, Google's Profit Beats Wall St. Forecast, N.Y.
Times,
Apr.
17,
2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/17/technology/17cnd-google.html
(reporting on Google's net income for 2008 of $1.31 billion).
243.
The class action vehicle can provide a way for claimants who otherwise would not
have the resources to sue a company like Google to join forces and do so. In the spring of 2009,
two trademark class actions filed against Google alleged that Google's AdWords practice of
selling trademarks in advertising amounts to trademark infringement. See Complaint, John
Beck Amazing Profits, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. 2:2009cv00151 (E.D. Tex. May 14, 2009),
arailable
at
http://news.justia.com/cases/featured/texas/txedce/2:2009cv0151/116195;
Complaint, FPX, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. 2:2009cv00142 (E.D. Tex. May 11, 2009), available at
http://news.justia.com/cases/featured/texas/txedce/2:2009cv0142/116152. If the two classes of
plaintiffs succeed in obtaining class certification, the class action forum may provide trademark
owners with a powerful means of joining forces against large corporations like Google. See
Gregory T. Casamento et al., Implications of Google AdWords Class Actions, LAW360, July 30,
2009, http://www.lockelord.com/files/News/d6deed39-5dfl-4c8b-9248-9d594462084e/
Presentation/NewsAttachment/dcb3e ldf-08c8-4b3b-bclb-9e8367285609/2009-08 Houston
ImplicationsGoogle VanSlyke.pdf.
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are only multiplied when advertisers do business in multiple
countries. Since Google is a near monopolist in the search engine
market, 244 it can effectively forestall the development of judicial
precedent that would benefit all parties by providing needed
uniformity.
Rather than precluding the development of case law, Google
and other search engines should help remedy the situation by
adopting policies that are more favorable to trademark holders and
consistent across national boundaries. One route would be for Google
to preclude the bidding of trademarked keywords worldwide.
Alternatively, since free riding is more likely an issue for famous
marks, Google could at least prohibit the sale of famous trademarks as
keywords in countries, such as the U.S., where Google does not
currently restrict the use of trademarks as keywords. However, such
a remedy would fail to cover many trademark owners who may not be
considered famous but are well-known enough that competitors will
pay to use their trademarks as keywords. Another option would be for
Google to adopt a policy similar to Yahoo!'s and prohibit competitors
from purchasing trademarks
unless they affirm that the
advertisement will meet certain non-competitive conditions. 24 Such
changes would still allow Google to reap revenue from selling
keywords and would not significantly interfere with the search
engine's goal of providing information to the computer user.
An amendment to the Lanham Act would also be beneficial and
would provide clear guidance to both courts and search engines about
how to approach the issue. The Act was already amended once to
respond to trademark issues arising from the Internet context when
the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act was enacted in
1999.246 Since the Lanham Act as written provides hollow remedies
for trademark plaintiffs in the keyword advertising context, an
amendment to handle this new, invisible use of trademarks should
place more emphasis on protecting the goodwill in a trademark and
preventing unlawful free riding off another's name recognition. Until
the Supreme Court or Congress decides to step in, however, Google
should modify its policies to provide consistent protection for
trademark keywords across national boundaries.

244.
245.
246.
The ACPA

See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA). 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2009).
provides a remedy for cybersquatting trademarked domain names. Id.
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